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ABSTRACT With the rapid growth of technology in recent years, we are surrounded by or even dependent
on the use of technological devices such as smartphones as they are now an indispensable part of our life.
Smartphone applications (apps) provide a wide range of utilities such as navigation, entertainment, fitness,
etc. To provide such context-sensitive services to users, apps need to access users’ data including sensitive
ones, which in turn, can potentially lead to privacy invasions. To protect users against potential privacy
invasions in such a vulnerable ecosystem, legislation such as the European Union General Data Protection
Regulation (EU GDPR) demands best privacy practices. Therefore, app developers are required to make
their apps compatible with legal privacy principles enforced by law. However, this is not an easy task for
app developers to comprehend purely legal principles to understandwhat needs to be implemented. Similarly,
bridging the gap between legal principles and technical implementations to understand how legal principles
need to be implemented is another barrier to develop privacy-friendly apps. To this end, this paper proposes
a privacy and security design guide catalog for app developers to assist them in understanding and adopting
the most relevant privacy and security principles in the context of smartphone apps. The presented catalog
is aimed at mapping the identified legal principles to practical privacy and security solutions that can be
implemented by developers to ensure enhanced privacy alignedwith existing legislation. Through conducting
a case study, it is confirmed that there is a significant gap between what developers are doing in reality and
what they promise to do. This paper provides researchers and developers of privacy-related technicalities an
overview of the characteristics of existing privacy requirements needed to be implemented in smartphone
ecosystems, on which they can base their work.
INDEX TERMS App, developers, GDPR, guideline catalog, privacy engineering, smartphone apps.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the benefits resulting from mobile applications
(apps), the massive collection of users’ personal data has
raised serious privacy concerns. Users are often unaware
of data collection practices of apps and unknowingly make
a compromise against their own privacy for financial and
functional benefits. This is also due to the lack of proper
transparency notices and privacy indicators in app markets
that would make users aware of privacy practices of apps and
could assist them in an informed privacy decision-making
process [1]. As the main producer of apps, developers are
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Peter Langendorfer.
demanded by law [2], [3] to fulfill privacy and security
principles. This is highly important, as privacy and security
design decisions made by developers may directly/indirectly
influence users’ privacy decision-making process [4].
Although increasing mobile users’ privacy awareness is
gently being explored [5]–[9], there exists a need to increase
the privacy awareness of app developers and assist them
in designing privacy and security preserving apps. Several
studies [10]–[13] showed that privacy unawareness of
app developers is responsible for designing and develop-
ing security- and privacy-unfriendly apps. For instance,
Peng et al. [12] highlighted the effectiveness of assigning
risk scores to apps by initiating feedback mechanisms to
encourage developers to reduce the risk that an app introduces
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to a given smartphone. The authors in [11], [14] also signaled
the absence of privacy-aware app development practicewhich
leads to a growth in the total number of over-privileged apps
asking for more permissions than needed for their proper
functionality. This gets even more critical when it comes
to pre-installed apps as they have more power to control
and customize Android phones through platform-defined
higher protection level permissions such as Signature and
SignatureOrSystem level permissions. Also, they cannot be
(easily) uninstalled by users. It was also shown that such apps
are an obvious threat to users’ privacy as they are oftentimes
over-privileged [14]. Therefore, developers of such apps must
more seriously take privacy principles into account and they
must accept their responsibility to protect end-users.
To protect users, regulators are increasingly demanding
app developers to design their apps in a secure- and privacy-
enhancing way. In addition, privacy and security shall be
embedded in the design phase of IT products such as mobile
apps [15] not only at an individual level, but also industrial/
enterprise level [16]. However, designing and developing
security- and privacy-friendly apps is not an easy task for
developers due to their limited knowledge of legal and techni-
cal aspects of privacy and security principles. Also, due to the
comprehensiveness and diverse nature of available regulatory
documents, it is highly challenging for developers to easily
and quickly grasp the most relevant privacy and security
principle guidelines needed to be followed.
Previous studies are mainly focused on users’ privacy
awareness and app developers’ privacy awareness is not a
well-explored research direction yet. Thus, it is of particular
importance to provide up-to-date guidelines and instructions
aligned with recently adopted regulations and privacy princi-
ples to further support app developers for designing security-
and privacy-friendly apps. Regulations such as the European
Union General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR),
ePrivacy Directive and Regulation are already calling for
actions to somehow revamp this situation. But there is still
a huge gap between the legal nature of privacy and security
principles (in the context of smartphone apps) and the techni-
cal implementation of those principles [17]. In other words,
a privacy engineering perspective is needed to fill the gap
between secure mobile app development and legal privacy
principles needed to be followed by developers. There are
already guidelines on principles needed for mobile apps that
can be helpful to increase the privacy awareness of mobile
app developers. However, such guidelines are suffering from
serious issues. Hence, their usefulness and applicability are
quite limited. For instance, they are sometimes written in
a very vague language. Also, they sometimes suffer from
purely legal definitions – which are hard to follow by devel-
opers who do not have legal knowledge – and incomplete-
ness in covering relevant principles. In some cases, they are
not compatible with recent privacy and security changes in
mobile operating systems (OSs).
This paper introduces App Developers Guide as a guide
catalog considering an engineering view to assist app
developers in understanding, following, and applying essen-
tial privacy and security principles in smartphone ecosystems.
The guide catalog consists of the most relevant privacy and
security principles extracted through an intensive literature
review considering the relevant national and international
regulatory documents. This catalog is supposed to serve as a
guide for app developers before, during, and after app design
and development phases. It also comprises technical language
definitions to make the legal principles more understandable
for developers. The contributions resulted from this paper are
summarized as follows:
1) extracting and proposing a guide catalog consisting of
the most relevant privacy and security design principles
in the context of smartphone apps aiming at supporting
Privacy-by-Design [15] and assisting app developers
in applying good privacy practices before, during and
after app design and development phases. The catalog
also went through data protection expert discussions
to examine its relevance to data protection practices of
smartphone apps;
2) extracting the most recent and relevant technical guide-
lines to assist developers inmapping the identified legal
principles to practical privacy and security solutions;
3) providing an understanding of what smartphone apps
promise and what they do in reality by considering their
privacy policy texts and personal data access patterns.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides an understanding of smartphone ecosystems and
gives an insight into the relevant legal privacy principles.
Section III introduces and describes the research design
including the taken steps for the extraction of App Developers
Guide. Section IV proposes a classification scheme to map
the reviewed privacy principles to technical implementation
guidelines based on the characteristics of reviewed principles
detected in the literature. Through real-world experiments,
Section V then discusses current issues associated with what
mobile app developers promise (based on the proposed map-
ping in this paper) and what they do in reality and it gives
insights into the potential revitalization. Finally, Section VI
provides conclusions and summarizes this paper.
II. SMARTPHONE ECOSYSTEMS AND PRIVACY
PRINCIPLES
To have a better understanding of current smartphone ecosys-
tems, Section II-A provides an overview of the existing
stakeholders. Followed by this, the relevant privacy princi-
ples with a focus on European law are further discussed in
Section II-B.
A. SMARTPHONE ECOSYSTEMS
The term ‘‘smartphone ecosystem’’ comprises smartphones’
hardware and software platforms including apps running on
top of the platform, as well as infrastructural components
such as app markets (e.g., Google Play, App Store) [18].
There are several key elements in a given smartphone ecosys-
tem as follows:
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• Users are the endpoint of smartphone ecosystems.
As the final consumers, services/utilities provided by
apps are delivered to users.
• Smartphones are multi-purpose devices equipped with
sensing and recording capabilities such as camera,
microphone, fingerprint recognition, proximity sensors,
gyroscope, accelerometer, and more. These are embed-
ded into the hardwaremade available to apps and theOS.
Mobile OSs already embedded mechanisms to control
and limit the amount of personal information accessed
by users’ installed apps. For instance, in Android, apps
can request access to the device’s resources through
permissions. Depending on the resource types, consent
from users is required. Android defines four types of
permissions1: Normal, Dangerous, Signature, and Sig-
natureOrSystem. Normal level permissions allow access
to resources that are considered low-risk, and they are
granted during the installation of any package requesting
them. The Dangerous level permissions are supposed
to access resources that are considered to be high-risk.
In this case, the user must grant permission. So-called
Signature level permissions grant access only to pack-
ages with the same author. Finally, SignatureOrSystem
level permissions grant access only to those apps that are
in a dedicated folder on theAndroid system image or that
are signed with the same certificate. They are used for
special situations where multiple vendors have apps
built into a system image and need to share specific
features explicitly because they are being built together.
Every app has an AndroidManifest.xml file that
contains information about that particular app (e.g.,
its name, author, icon, and description). It also pro-
vides information about the required permissions that
are requested by the developer. In iOS, developers are
allowed to gain access to the device’s resources by reg-
istering their apps via some privacy keys in a property
list called Information Property List (info.plist).
Developers are asked to statically declare the intent
to access a certain sensitive resource. This declaration
includes the privacy key and purpose string (explaining
why access to such a sensitive resource is needed by the
app) registered in info.plist.
• Apps are the main source of delivering services/utilities
to users such as navigation, e-health, e-learning, trans-
portation, etc. To successfully deliver such services, they
evidently need to access certain data types and permis-
sions such as camera, phone number, email address,
outgoing calls, etc.
• Developers contribute to the mass market (app stores)




• App stores are rich sources of apps and they
directly or indirectly communicate with app developers
and users.
• There are also other entities in smartphone ecosystems,
such as operators that create and maintain wireless ser-
vices over cellular networks, third-parties and advertis-
ing networks that display targeted/non-targeted ads to
users, smartphone manufacturers, and so on.
B. RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES
In early 2016 the EU decided on the GDPR [2]. SinceMay 25,
2018, it is directly applicable in all Member States. The same
date the German BDSG-neu [19] came into force, comple-
menting the GDPR in its opening clauses, which have to
be defined on a national level. The GDPR applies ‘‘to the
processing of personal data in the context of the activities
of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the
Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the
Union or not’’ (Art. 3 (1)). The element of importance here is
whether the person whose personal data is being processed,
is within the EU or not. In this context, personal data is
defined as ‘‘any information relating to an identified or iden-
tifiable natural person’’, also called data subject (Art. 4 (1)).
This definition is rather broad, resulting in difficult legal
discussions on whether a specific data type is to be regarded
as personal data or not. However, due to the highly personal
nature of smartphones, any data collected from them may be
classified as personal data as stated in Recital 24 of the Direc-
tive on privacy and electronic communications 2002/58/EC
(ePrivacy Directive) [20] of the European Parliament and
Council: ‘‘Terminal equipment of users of electronic com-
munications networks and any information stored on such
equipment are part of the private sphere of the users requiring
protection under the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’’.
This includes not only data like private pictures or mes-
sages but also device’s identifiers, location or even meta-
data [21]. Notably, the GDPR still applies if the data is
pseudonymized as it is still regarded as personal data.
However not if it is anonymized since it is not recognizable
from other data (more details in Section IV-B) [21]. Special
treatment is conferred to data which is categorized as sensi-
tive data, such as racial or ethnic origin, political opinions,
biometric or health data or similar (Art. 9 (1), GDPR). Thus,
neither pictures nor metadata are classified as sensitive data,
but since they may reveal such, they must be treated with
caution [21]. Since the processing of such data would create
‘‘significant risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms’’
of the data subject, the collection and processing of such data
types are only allowed under certain exceptions, e.g., explicit
consent (Art. 9 (2), GDPR). However, if the processing is
disproportionate, the consent is considered to be invalid [21].
Moreover, prior to the consent, users must be provided with
clear and comprehensive information about their actions [2],
[20], [22]. The consent must be gained before processing
personal data (Art. 5 (3), GDPR). Additionally, in order to
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be able to make an informed decision, consent must also be
specific (to the data that is processed), freely given (data
subjects must have the choice to refuse the processing of
personal data), and obtained by active choice [21], [23].
Lastly, users must be given the option to easily and effectively
withdraw their consent [22]. Special protective measures are
also laid on the processing of children’s data.Many app stores
offer a large assortment of apps targeted at children. However,
children are considered to have little or no knowledge of
the risks associated with the usage of smartphones. Hence,
the processing of children’s data is only lawful if the child
is over the age of 16 or if consent is given by the holder of
parental responsibility and only to the extent it is explicitly
given (Art. 8 (1), GDPR). Data controllers are further asked
to provide information in an understandable language to chil-
dren [22]. As throughout this paper certain privacy-related
terms are used a lot, for better understanding their definitions
are clarified as follows (defined by Art. 4 of the GDPR):
– Data controller means the natural or legal per-
son, public authority, agency or another body which,
alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes
and means of the processing of personal data; where the
purposes and means of such processing are determined
by the Union or Member State law.
– Data processor means a natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or another body which processes per-
sonal data on behalf of the controller.
– Data subject is an identified or identifiable natural per-
son who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in par-
ticular by reference to an identifier such as a name,
an identification number, location data, etc.
Typically, the data controller is thus the app provider,
whereas the app developer is typically a data processor.
In cases where the app provider is the same person as the
app developer, she is regarded as the data controller. In legal
terms, the data controller is the most important entity, since
she must guarantee compliance with legislation [21]. If data-
driven functionalities such as advertisement networks are
integrated into an app, several data controllers might be at
place. There might as well exist several data processors, for
instance, if cloud services are used, which process personal
data [21]. Throughout this paper, the terms ‘‘data subject’’
and ‘‘user’’ are used interchangeably. The same also applies
to ‘‘data controller’’, ‘‘data processor’’, ‘‘app provider’’, and
‘‘app developer’’.
In both the EU GDPR and the BDSG-neu several data
protection principles are incorporated as a basis [24]. They
are defined in Art. 5(1) of the GDPR and are presented in the
following:
1) LAWFULNESS, FAIRNESS, AND TRANSPARENCY
Art. 5 (1a) GDPR states that when processing personal data,
it should happen in a ‘‘lawfully, fairly and a transparent
manner’’ towards the data subject. This implies that it should
be laid open to what data is collected for what purpose,
which systems and processes are used, where data is being
transferred, who is legally responsible for data in what phase
and how to contact that person [22], [24]. This is highly
important as it may help data subjects and supervisory author-
ities to identify deficits and if necessary, take appropriate
actions. Since this is of great importance in the GDPR,
a whole chapter (Chapter 3, GDPR) has been dedicated to
the rights of data subjects. For instance, the right to access and
correct personal data, the right to object to the processing of
their data, the right to erasure, the right to data portability and
the right to object automated individual decision-making are
captured here among many other rights (Art. 12-23 GDPR).
When it comes to smartphone ecosystems, as part of the prin-
ciple of transparency, the app provider should clearly inform
users about the processing of their data prior to app installa-
tion. This information must, however, also be accessible from
within the app [22]. Furthermore, it is required to notify users
in the case of a data breach, if there is a high risk to the rights
and freedoms of users (Art. 34, GDPR). Additionally, users
need to get informed on the safeguards, that have been taken
into consideration to protect data if it is processed outside of
the EU (Art. 13 (1f), Art. 14 (1f), GDPR).
2) PURPOSE LIMITATION
Personal data is suitable to be used in various contexts. The
more detailed such data sets become (possibly also through
the aggregation with public data) and the more informative
value they contain, the more interesting they get for other
parties [24]. Therefore, Art. 5 (1b) GDPR limits the collection
and processing of personal data to ‘‘specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes’’. The processing for further purposes,
which are incompatible with the original ones, is only granted
in specific situations such as archiving purposes for the public
interest. (Art. 5 (1b), GDPR).
3) DATA MINIMIZATION
This principle goes hand in hand with the principle of pur-
pose limitation and is especially interesting when dealing
with big data applications [24], where huge amounts of per-
sonal data are collected to analyze customers. Personal data
must be adequate, relevant, and limited to what is necessary
in relation to the purposes for which they are processed
(Art. 5 (1c), GDPR). It is also closely interrelated to the con-
cept of Privacy-by-Design, which has become an obligation
set in Art. 25 GDPR. Hence, it should be analyzed whether
the processing of a specific type of personal data is required
and if so, to what extent it is necessary, by which entities and
persons it should be done, to what extent they should gain
control over the data, and over what period of time [24].
4) ACCURACY
Accuracy states that all personal data shall be accurate and
kept up to date. Furthermore, every reasonable step must be
taken to ensure that inaccurate personal is erased or rectified
without delay, in having regard to the purposes for which they
are processed (Art. 5 (1d), GDPR).
35432 VOLUME 8, 2020
M. Hatamian: Engineering Privacy in Smartphone Apps: Technical Guideline Catalog for App Developers
5) STORAGE LIMITATION
Personal data must be kept in a form which permits the
identification of data subjects for no longer than necessary
for the purposes for which the personal data is processed.
The data may only be stored for longer periods in explicit
situations, e.g., for archiving purposes in the public interest
(Art. 5 (1e), GDPR). Accordingly, this means not only the
deletion of personal records when the data subjects are no
longer active, but also the erasure of individual data fields
and attributes if they are not strictly needed (anymore) [24].
6) INTEGRITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
Personal data must be processed in a manner that ensures
appropriate security, including protection against unautho-
rized or unlawful processing and accidental loss, destruction,
or damage. To do so, appropriate technical or organizational
measures should be taken into account (Art. 5 (1f), GDPR).
This implies that the data being processed must remain intact,
complete, up-to-date and that only authorized persons –
even with the organization of the data controller – may gain
access [24].
7) ACCOUNTABILITY
The principle of accountability requires data collectors to
demonstrate how they comply with data protection regu-
lations (Art. 5 (2), GDPR). When personal data is being
processed, data collectors are required to carefully document
all decision-making procedures with respect to the ongoing
data processing such as maintaining specific documentation
on what personal data is processed (how, for how long and
for what purposes) and conducting data protection impact
assessment to tackle data protection issues (more details in
Section IV-F)
8) PRIVACY-BY-DESIGN
Although Privacy-by-Design is not a principle under Art.
5(1), the GDPR pays special attention to it as a frequently-
discussed concept related to data protection (Art. 25, GDPR).
Privacy-by-Design focuses on embedding data protection
through the technology design life cycle [15]. In other
words, regardless of the purposes that an IT product targets,
Privacy-by-Design ensures that a given IT product is designed
with privacy as a priority. Privacy-by-Design is also highly
connected to the Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP) [25].
According to this principle, ‘‘every program and every user
of the system should operate using the least set of privileges
necessary to complete the job’’. This principle is strongly
asking developers/programmers to give apps the minimum
number of permissions necessary for providing a certain func-
tionality/service. For instance, a flashlight app simply needs
to access the device’s sensor to properly deliver its desired
functionality. Hence, such an app does not need to access
sensitive information, such as contact list, location, phone
number, etc. Accordingly, PoLP is directly tied to Privacy-
by-Design and ‘‘data minimization’’ as well.
III. APP DEVELOPERS GUIDE: RESEARCH DESIGN
This section elaborates on all the steps that were taken into
account to extract, compile and provide App Developers
Guide aiming at assisting app developers in exercising good
privacy practices before, during and after designing smart-
phone apps. Fig. 1 summarizes a high-level diagram regard-
ing the methodological steps of App Developers Guide.
FIGURE 1. Methodological steps of App Developers Guide.
In the first phase, a regulatory document review was
conducted to develop a preliminary set of relevant principles.
For this, guidelines on how to handle privacy and data security
in smartphones, published by acknowledged institutions and
authorities have been examined. The largest source of suitable
publications for the development of privacy and security
design principles are the EU institutions. The most important
documents are the GDPR and ePrivacy Directive and Regu-
lation [2], [20], [26] by the European Commission, Council
and Parliament. Of particular interest is furthermore the
‘‘Article 29. Opinion 02/2013 on Apps on Smart
Devices’’ [22], a document published by the Data Protec-
tion Working Party, as an independent European advisory
body on data protection and privacy. As the name of the
document suggests, it is a comment on Art. 29 of the Data
Protection Directive, explaining in more detail its effects on
the processing of personal data by apps on smart devices (in
particular smart mobile devices). Other EU recommendations
of interest can be found in the ‘‘Guidelines on the Protection
of Personal Data Processed by Mobile Applications Provided
by European Union Institutions’’ [23] which is directed at
the EU institutions, developing and distributing their own
mobile apps. As they are required to act as role models,
these guidelines can also be helpful for other app developers.
In particular, they deal with the question of how to process
personal data in mobile apps while complying with data pro-
tection obligations set out by the EU. Furthermore, two pub-
lications by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity
(ENISA) offered advice on how to protect privacy in mobile
VOLUME 8, 2020 35433
M. Hatamian: Engineering Privacy in Smartphone Apps: Technical Guideline Catalog for App Developers
environments [21], [27]. The first document is intended for
app developers, giving advice on how to design apps in a
secure manner. The second one has taken an app developer-
centric approach, providing a meta-study on privacy and data
protection in mobile apps in compliance with the GDPR.
Besides those supranational institutions, several national
bodies have set out their recommendations, as well. For
instance, the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI, German: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informa-
tionstechnik) [28] has deeply investigated the functionality
of mobile services, considering the possible security risks
and it gives advice on countermeasures. Furthermore, the
‘‘Standard Data Protection Model’’ authorized and acknowl-
edged by the German Conference of the Independent Data
Protection Authorities of the Bund and the Länder [24] has
been taken into account. It presents a methodology to assess
the efficacy of data protection with respect to European and
German federal data protection regulations. It is intended for
data controllers, giving advice on how to manage data pro-
tection measures enabling supervisory authorities to provide
better transparency [24]. Also, the UK Information Commis-
sioner’s Office (ICO) ‘‘Privacy in Mobile Apps: Guidance
for App Developers’’ [29] has been taken into consideration.
The ICO is an independent authority in the UK (sponsored
by the Department for Digital, Culture Media and Sport),
which aims at upholding information rights and promoting
‘‘openness by public bodies and data privacy for individuals’’.
As the title states, it deals with practical aspects of the protec-
tion of smartphone users’ privacy by app developers. From
outside the EU, ‘‘Privacy on the Go: Recommendations for
the Mobile Ecosystem’’ [30] from the California Department
of Justice has been analyzed. It presents recommendations
not only for app developers, but also app platform providers,
advertising networks, and others. Other than the guidelines
set out by the European countries, it builds on the California
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) which first came
into force in 2004. Additionally, a workshop summary by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
of the US Department of Commerce entitled ‘‘Public Safety
Mobile Application Security Requirements’’ [31] has been
examined. It covers the takeaways of the workshop, where
experts provided their knowledge on privacy and security
requirements for public safety mobile apps. Being developed
by the EU institutions, these public safety apps are required to
be developed in an exemplary manner. Hence, the document
provides useful recommendations for the development of
apps in general. Moreover,‘‘Mobile Privacy: A Better Prac-
tice Guide for Mobile App Developers’’ developed and
published by the Office of the Australian Information Com-
missioner (OAIC) [32] was investigated. The document is
aimed at supporting app developers for embedding enhanced
privacy practices in their products and services. In addition to
these governmental publishers, other sources, i.e., one non-
profit organization and one commercial provider of security
solutions, have been taken into consideration [33], [34].
Based on the information extracted from the literature
review phase, relevant principles were extracted, and the
overlaps between them were checked to ease the process of
final compilation. Further, technical recommendations and
requirements were carefully reviewed, and those were fit-
ting the identified legal privacy and security principles were
extracted. It is worth mentioning that, the identified legal
privacy and security principles have been revised with the
help of data protection experts (with a special focus on the
recently adopted GDPR). Finally, the principles and their
corresponding technical recommendations went through dis-
cussions with a group of app developers in the form of a mod-
erated session. This way, the expert opinion was gathered and
helped to improve the understanding of recommendations.
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF PRIVACY PRINCIPLES
In this section, the results of the App Developers Guide,
including the identified privacy principles and their respec-
tive technical implementation guidelines are introduced.
As defined in [35], the term classification is used to charac-
terize the systemic properties and forms of interaction. Such
a classification provides a well-structured overview facilitat-
ing the understanding of workflow as shown in Fig. 2. The
following subsections detail each extracted class.
A. PURPOSE LIMITATION AND DATA MINIMIZATION
Mobile apps are constantly sharing data (including sensitive
ones) to different parties ranging from remote servers to
other apps. It is of particular importance to pay attention to
both aspects as the latter is sometimes underestimated by
developers. Thus, additional protection and control mecha-
nisms should be anticipated and developed to avoid illegal
calls from other apps [34]. The GDPR states that personal
data shall be ‘‘collected for specified, explicit and legitimate
purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incom-
FIGURE 2. Classification of the reviewed legal principles and their mapping to technical implementation guidelines.
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patible with those purposes; further processing for archiving
purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research
purposes or statistical purposes shall, in accordance with
Art. 89 (1), not be considered to be incompatible with the ini-
tial purposes’’, Art. 5 (1b). When data is collected from users
in mobile app ecosystems, such data has to be considered as
personal data as in the meaning of the GDPR. Additionally,
the relevant data to the smartphone itself, such as the device’s
identifier is also categorized as personal data [21]. Therefore,
to fully comply with the GDPR Art. 6 (4) (‘‘data processing
for incompatible purposes should be avoided unless it is
on the basis of a specific set of criteria in the GDPR’’),
developers must only process data when the app has a specific
lawful purpose for doing so. To overcome such challenges,
the following sub-principles and their respective technical
recommendations need to be considered by developers.
1) SHARING LIMITATION
The transmission of personal data to third-parties must be
avoided unless such transfer is necessary for the purpose.
Also, developers need to appropriately limit the amount of
personal data being sharedwith other apps. Hence, an app that
has been granted permission-protected resources must not
leak them to other apps. Moreover, data sharing must be
isolated by default unless explicitly specified or otherwise
chosen by the user. The following recommendations can be
helpful to fulfill this sub-principle:
– Only data which is required for the proper functionality
of the app must be collected and disclosed.
– Cryptographic protocols need be initialized to mini-
mize data collection without having data flow to service
providers.
– Apps must not communicate personal data to a third-
party or other apps unless this transfer is aligned with
the purpose.
– Data sharing with other apps must be restricted, e.g.,
by implementing an Android Content Provider.
– The use of fine location data and/or sharing such data
with third-party apps must be minimized and limited to
specified purposes.
– If an app is intended for children under the age of 13 or if
a developer is knowingly collecting personal data from
children under such an age, he/she may have additional
obligations under federal law.
2) THIRD-PARTIES AND THIRD-COUNTRIES SHARING
When sharing data with third-parties, the legal standards of
the country where the third-party resides plays an increas-
ingly important role. Considering Art. 13 (1f), 14 (1f) of
the GDPR, data transfer to other countries is only law-
ful, where a similar level of protection as provided by the
GDPR is guaranteed. Whether this is the case needs to be
assessed by the European Commission and can be done on the
basis of a country, territory, specified sector, or international
organization. Besides these restrictions on where to share
personal data, Art. 13 (1f), 14 (1f) require data controllers
to adopt appropriate safeguards and means followed by
contractual arrangements with the recipient of the personal
data approved by the European Commission. The following
recommendations can help to fulfill this sub-principle:
– Rigorous code analysis must be conducted to make sure
that apps do not intentionally/unintentionally transfer
sensitive data to remote servers and any other external
entities.
– The use of SMS andMMS as amean for transferring sen-
sitive data such as security tokens must be as minimized
as possible as they might be invaded.
– End-to-end secure channel such as TLSmust be enforced
when sending sensitive information over the internet.
– The data received from third-parties must be validated
before processing them within an app, including local
apps, OS services as well as data received over the
network.
3) THIRD-PARTY CONTENT
Developers are required to be mindful of third-party compo-
nents used in their app design and development phases. Such
components may impose serious privacy and security risks
by leaking sensitive data on purpose or by accident [21]. This
is highly critical as an app provider or developer (in the role
of a data controller) is legally responsible for making sure
that third-parties process sensitive data lawfully, fairly and
transparently [21]. However, this is quite challenging due to
the architectural limitation of existing permission manager
models in mobile apps as they do not give the possibility
to developers to separately grant sensitive permissions to
a given app and its integrated third-party components. The
following recommendations can help developers to fulfill this
sub-principle:
– The reliability and authenticity of third-party compo-
nents (libraries, codes, etc.) must be carefully checked
before using them (e.g., by auditing codes and libraries
for security issues).
– After integrating third-party components, regular secu-
rity updates must be applied.
– Following good privacy practices, developers should use
custom keyboards for receiving inputs from users (user-
names, passwords, credit card details, etc.) as third-
party keyboards may not be reliable.
– Whenever third-party servers (outside the EU) are used
as a back-end, developers must be aware that the cor-
responding regulations applied to third-country data
sharing practices are enforced.
– The overall architectural design of apps should allow
developers to replace those third-party components that
are either violating data protection principles or not
behaving as initially promised.
B. UNLINKABILITY
Unlinkability is closely tied to anonymization and
pseudonymization. Recital 26 of the GDPR defines anony-
mous information as ‘‘. . . information which does not relate to
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an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data
rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is
not or no longer identifiable’’. As it can be inferred from the
definition, anonymization and pseudonymization techniques
are used to increase the ambiguity of data in case the deletion
of personal data is not possible [27]. It is worth mentioning
that, as anonymized personal data is not distinguishable from
any other type of data, therefore, the legislation is not applied
to it. However, this is not the case for pseudonymized data
as it is still a subset of personal data as stated by Art. 4 (5)
the GDPR. Pseudonymization is defined as ‘‘the processing
of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can
no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the
use of additional information, provided that such additional
information is kept separately and is subject to technical and
organizational measures to ensure that the personal data is not
attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person’’.
Depending on the situation and type of personal data
that app developers are going to process, they may have to
use either anonymization or pseudonymization. For example,
in clinical application domains where the tests need to be
repeated and compared several times, it is difficult or almost
impossible to use anonymization. But pseudonymizationmay
work because it is still possible to link and re-identify differ-
ent data by having additional information.
1) ANONYMIZATION
Anonymization irreversibly destroys any way of identify-
ing users. In general, there are two different approaches to
anonymization. The first approach is based on randomization
while the second is based on generalization [36].
Randomization techniques alter the accuracy of data to
destroy the chances of linking personal data to individu-
als. Noise addition is one of the subsets of randomization
techniques and its main goal is to change those attributes
(in a given data set) that may have an adverse impact on
individuals. For instance, a data set of a fitness app that
contains users’ heartbeat values could be anonymized by
randomly adding or subtracting a number between 1 and 10 to
the heartbeat records, and then removing the attached name
records. This would enable the developer to know the average
heartbeat of users (within a margin of error) but would pre-
vent an adversary from learning their real heartbeat values.
Permutation is another subset of randomization techniques.
It consists of shuffling the values of attributes in a table so
that some of them are artificially linked to different users.
Such swapping ensures that the range and distribution of
values remain the same but correlations between values and
individuals will not.
Generalization techniques, on the other hand, are based
on generalizing users’ attributes by altering scales or orders
of magnitude, e.g., coarse location permission rather than
fine location permission. K-anonymity is a subset of gen-
eralization techniques and it aims at preventing users from
being singled out by grouping them with, at least, k other
individuals. In other words, attributes are shared by k users.
Therefore, it should be no longer possible to single out an
individual within a group of k users. L-diversity is an exten-
sion of k-anonymity and it tries to minimize the frequency
of equivalence classes with poor attribute diversity so that an
attacker with background knowledge on a specific user is left
with a remarkable doubt.
2) PSEUDONYMIZATION
Pseudonymization substitutes the identity of users in such
a way that additional information is required to re-identify
users. Hashing and tokenization are widely-applied subsets
of pseudonymization techniques [36].
Hashing is a form of pseudonymization that exploits math-
ematical algorithms to transform personal data into fixed-
length obscure alphanumeric strings, known as hash values.
The hashing of plain text into hash values is intended to be a
one-way data transformation process, as a hashing algorithm
is not reversible. The main goal of hashing is to validate
plain text inputs by hashing a plain text input value using
a defined hashing algorithm. The generated hash value is
then checked against a previously calculated and stored hash
value. If the hash values are the same, it is likely that the plain
text input and previously hashed plain text are the same. Such
a technique should be used to protect passwords stored in
databases, i.e., app developers should always store password
hash values instead of plain text passwords.
Tokenization is widely used in payment processing solu-
tions such as Apple Pay2 or PayPal.3 In such techniques,
a piece of data is replaced with a unique token that acts as
a stand-in which can be used to retrieve the original value.
For instance, a user’s credit card number is represented by
a token. When making a purchase, the merchant receiving
payment only has access to the token, rather than the actual
credit card number. Since Apple Pay knows the relationship
between the token and credit card number, it can take the
transaction information, retrieve the credit card number based
on the token, and process it like a normal purchase.
C. DATA RETENTION
Developers are required to be clear about the retention period
and they should limit it only to the amount of time needed to
provide the desired service. Thus, any personal data should be
instantly deleted (including stored data on the remote servers)
after the expiration of the retention period. Additionally, any
confidential data including users’ credentials, such as pass-
words, credit card details, etc. must be successfully deleted
upon app uninstallation from the device and any other storage
medium.
D. TRANSPARENCY
Transparency is one of the key principles of the GDPR
(see Section II-B1). When it comes to smartphone apps,
developers are required to be clear and explicit about their
2https://www.apple.com/apple-pay/, Accessed: 09.01.2020
3https://www.paypal.com/, Accessed: 09.01.2020
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data access, collection, process, and transfer practices. Also,
developers are responsible for determining the internal rules
once data collection purposes change. This also entails the
communication of such changes to users before they come
into effect. Furthermore, any incident regarding users’ per-
sonal data shall be promptly communicated to them, e.g.,
in case personal data breach happens, users and the respective
Data Protection Authority must be immediately informed
(this also includes the potential occurred risks and possi-
ble countermeasures). To further raise users’ awareness and
attention, using real-time contextual information (audio and
video) is highly recommended. Ultimately, to further improve
transparency, a clear, comprehensive, understandable, and
legitimate privacy policy text should be accessible to users.
It is important to note that, if developers and data controllers
are the same entity, then clear instructions must be provided
to users enabling them to understand how they can contact
developers to file compliant, withdraw consent, ask for the
record of personal data collection, etc. Two relevant sources
of providing transparency-enabling information to users are
app privacy policy and app description (both published on
app markets).
1) APP PRIVACY POLICY
An app privacy policy is a statement or a legal document
that gives information about the ways an app provider col-
lects, uses, discloses, and manages users’ data. An honest
app provider is required to fulfill the following privacy policy
principles.
a: DATA COLLECTION
Smartphones contain a considerable amount of sensitive per-
sonal data. Hence, app developers must only collect and
process the data that is strictly necessary (data minimization)
for the purposes for which it has been collected (purpose
limitation). The legal foundation is set in Art. 5 (1) and
Art. 6 GDPR. While the former article states the general
principles of processing personal data, the latter indicates
when processing is lawful, including when consent is given,
when it is necessary for the performance of a contract or com-
pliance with a legal obligation, to protect vital interests of
user or another natural person, and when processing is nec-
essary for a task carried out in the public interest or for
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third-
party. However, this applies if and only if such interests do
not override the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms
of users. Monetizing purposes, i.e., advertising, are not clas-
sified as necessary and therefore need to be based on another
legal ground. Similarly, the processing of data to develop new
features and services is not specific enough to comply with
this section [21].
b: CHILDREN PROTECTION
According to the GDPR, information related to children must
be treated with the utmost caution, as children ‘‘may be less
aware of the risks, consequences, and safeguards concerned
and their rights in relation to the processing of personal data’’
(Rec. 38 GDPR). This implies that services targeted at chil-
dren are obliged to provide information in clear and plain lan-
guage that children can understand easily (Rec. 58 GDPR).
Art. 8 GDPR defines that the processing of children’s data is
only lawful where the child is at least 16 years old. The data
processing of younger children is only legitimate if and to the
extent, a parent or legal guardian has given consent. However,
this article has an opening clause, allowing member states to
set a lower age for those purposes, yet not below 13 years.
c: THIRD-PARTY SHARING
Given the extensive data collection and sharing practices
in mobile apps, the principle of transparency is of great
importance for users to understand how their data is being
used. Furthermore, the significance of this aspect is even
greater for smartphone apps, since third-party components
(that might collect data as well) are often integrated into an
app’s development phase. The legal basis lies in Art. 13 (1e)
GDPR, stating that the recipients or categories of recipients
of personal data must be revealed to users.
d: THIRD-COUNTRY SHARING
When sharing data with others, not only the technical security
level is of importance, but also the legal standards of the
country where the third-party resides. This is of particular
importance for the EU citizens since many countries out-
side the EU may have lower privacy protection regulations.
Therefore, the GDPR dedicates itsChapter 5 to provisions on
transfers of personal data to third-countries or international
organizations. The transfer of data to other countries is only
lawful, where a similar level of protection as provided by the
GDPR is guaranteed. In fact, the protection of data travels
with the data itself. Thus, if app providers share personal data
with servers located outside the EU, they shall mention in
their privacy policy text how they deal with third-country data
sharing practices.
e: DATA PROTECTION
As mobile apps may access sensitive information, the loss or
theft of a smartphone, as well as data transfer, impose extreme
risk on users’ privacy. The next principle, therefore, deals
with data protection. This concern is met in the GDPR in
Art. 32, which states that the data controller must implement
appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure
appropriate security. This is of particular importance in smart-
phone ecosystems since they are typically linked to a huge
amount of data transfer. The aspect of data protection is also
closely correlated with Privacy-by-Design.
f: DATA RETENTION
The retention of data is a delicate issue, as app providers
may want to retain data as long as possible to enable future
transactions and purposes. However, this is often not in the
interest of users, particularly not for sensitive data as avail-
able in smartphones (e.g., personal information from dating
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apps or health data from fitness apps). To protect users,
the principle of data minimization and storage limitation
in combination with transparency take effect. Accordingly,
Art. 13 (2), 14 (2) of the GDPR state that the data controller
must inform users for what period their data is retained. This
is strictly required as users have ‘‘the right to be forgotten’’,
which is set in Art. 17 of the GDPR. This article states that
users do not only have ‘‘the right to obtain from the controller
for the erasure of personal data’’, but also data controller must
erase personal data if it is ‘‘no longer necessary in relation to
the purposes for which it was collected’’ (principle of purpose
limitation) and if users withdraw consent. However, in some
cases, the retention of data for a certain period is lawful, e.g.,
if there exists a legal obligation to do so (e.g., the German
Fiscal Code requires companies to store accounting records
for a period of 6 to 10 years).
g: USER’S CONTROL
As previously stated, the objective of the GDPR is to enable
users to retain control over their personal information (user’s
control). Accordingly, the whole Chapter 3 of the GDPR is
dedicated to the rights of users. The most important rights
are the right to information and access to personal data; the
right to rectification; the right to erasure (see the previous
principle); the right to restriction of processing; the right
to data portability; and the right to object and automated
individual decision-making. By Art. 13 (2), 14 (2) of the
GDPR, app providers are required to provide these rights to
users to ensure fair and transparent data processing (principle
of lawfulness, fairness and transparency Art. 5 (1a)).
h: PRIVACY POLICY CHANGES
To further ensure lawful, fair, and transparent processing
of data, app providers should inform users in a transparent
and understandable way about privacy policy changes. This
obligation is derived from Art. 12 of the GDPR.
i: PRIVACY BREACH NOTIFICATION
Besides Art. 12 GDPR, which lays the basis of informing
users, this principle is based on Art. 34 GDPR where it is
stated that if a data breach occurs that results in a high risk
to the rights and freedoms of users, the data controller must
inform users without undue delay. In this notification, the data
protection officer must be named and likely consequences
of the data breach as well as the measures taken to mitigate
the effects are described. The same is applicable for the
notification of the supervisory authority, which must be done
not later than 72 hours after the detection of a personal data
breach.
j: APP-FOCUSED
This principle is not particularly named in the GDPR.
However, it can be subsumed under the principle of lawful-
ness, fairness, and transparency. Sometimes a privacy policy
is not exclusively written for a specific app, but multiple
services provided by the same app developer (data controller).
For instance, Sunyaev et al. [37] identified five reoccur-
ring scopes of privacy policies, namely privacy policies for
a single app, for multiple apps, for a back-end app, for a
developer homepage or for all developer services. They also
found that several privacy policies of apps did not have an
app-related scope at all. This was also triggered in our data
protection expert discussions as an important principle to be
considered to examine the extent to which an app privacy
policy focuses on the app’s data protection practices (e.g.,
sensitive permission requests).
k: PURPOSE SPECIFICATION
This principle is closely related to the data collection prin-
ciple. While the focus of data collection is on what data is
collected, this principle refers to the clear statement of data
collection purposes. Besides the legal basis for data process-
ing, app providers are required to specify data collection
purposes according to Art. 13 (1c), 14 (1c) GDPR. This is
not only important under the aspect of lawfulness, fairness,
and transparency, but also the principle of purpose limitation
to prevent exploitation of personal data for other use cases.
l: CONTACT INFORMATION
Contact information is linked to the principle of lawfulness,
fairness, and transparency. According to Art. 13 (1a), 14 (1a)
GDPR, users have the right to be informed about the actual
identity of data collectors, i.e., app providers. This includes
the name of the app provider, if it is a legal entity, its legal
representatives as well as its postal address. The latter must
be provided to give users the possibility to file a formal
complaint.
2) APP DESCRIPTION
The app description is another element that can enable
app providers to generate transparency-supporting informa-
tion to users. The app description is an app market optimized
product definition where app developers describe the main
characteristics and details of their apps. The app description is
a very relevant piece of information that can play an important
role in a user’s decision-making process. Therefore, develop-
ers need to be clear and concise when explaining how their
app works and why people need it. It is also highly important
to make a logical connection between an app description and
the claimed permission declaration list by developers on the
app market (e.g., Google Play Store). For instance, if the
app is a restaurant finder and it requests to access the user’s
contact list, this should be clear in the app description to a
certain extent by adding sentences like ‘‘share your favorite
restaurant with your friends!’’. This would allow develop-
ers to follow best transparency practices as app description
should be written in such a way to enable users to grasp the
fundamental services/utilities offered by the app. This way,
users can make better informed privacy decisions by com-
prehending the rationale behind requesting certain sensitive
permissions.
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E. INTEGRITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
Art. 5 (1f) of the GDPR states that, ‘‘personal data shall
be processed in a manner that ensures appropriate secu-
rity, including protection against unauthorized or unlawful
processing and against accidental loss, destruction or dam-
age, using appropriate technical or organizational measures
(integrity and confidentiality)’’. Developers must make sure
that the app’s integrity is preserved intact by checking
resources for potential modifications. One way is to restrict
writing and modification permissions. In addition, all the
developer’s features should be disabled including debugging
privilege [38]. To avoid reverse engineering (or to make it
harder), data encryption and code obfuscation mechanisms
should be established. Also, developers must make sure that
the app’s confidentiality is ensured. One way is to offer strict
and secure authentication processes. Detecting andmitigating
vulnerabilities are also essential to protect users against exter-
nal factors (malware and hacking [39]). The following sub-
principles can help to ensure integrity and confidentiality:
1) SHARING SECURITY
Potential sources of private data leakage should be anticipated
and protected by developers. This also comprises caches and
temporary storage, including address books, gallery files,
etc. which are a possible source of privacy leakage. A typ-
ical example here is unauthorized access to pictures tagged
with users’ location allowing information to be shared in
unintended ways. Developers are strongly recommended to
assume that any kind of shared storage is untrusted. This
way, storing any unencrypted cached data in such a readable
directory should be avoided.
2) STORAGE SECURITY
Enforced by the GDPR Art. 5 (1e), the implementation of
appropriate technical and organizational measures to safe-
guard the rights and freedoms of users is highly important.
Hence, app developers have to adopt and apply up-to-date
protection and encryption mechanisms for data storing pur-
poses. This is mainly because insecure storage is not only a
risk factor when the device is stolen, but also when another
app accesses unencrypted raw data [34]. To ensure a good
protection level, storing and processing sensitive data on
the server-side is preferred than the client-side (with the
maximum level of protection ensured on the server-side).
Storing any sensitive data such as users’ credentials, location
information, etc. on the device’s storage in an unencrypted
form must be avoided.
3) UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS PREVENTION
To enhance trust between client-server communications,
unauthorized access prevention is essential. This means that
the user (who is running an app) should be securely authen-
ticated through appropriate authentication mechanisms. The
following considerations need to be taken into account to
ensure such measures:
– Provisioning plays a critical role as apps need to imple-
ment secure provisioning of cryptographic keys to a set
of devices corresponding to a user. This provisioning
includes device registration and/or push notification
registration that would enable users to have multiple
devices registered.
– Storing passwords in cache, logs or app binary must be
avoided.
– Since client-side security controls are capable of
being invaded, authentication and authorization con-
trols should be implemented on the server-side. Also,
in case passwords are stored locally on the device, it is
necessary to use strong encryption and key-store mech-
anisms provided by the OS.
– In case a password-based authentication mechanism is
adopted, a strong password policy should be enforced,
considering length, special characters, password dura-
tion, etc.
– Appropriate measures must be enforced to avoid brute-
force attack against authentication controls, e.g., ques-
tions about the user’s profile, informing user once a
failed login attempt is detected and enforcing account
lockout for a certain time frame.
– For apps accessing and processing highly sensitive data,
e.g., health data, it is essential to implement additional
authentication controls. For this, unreliable channels
such as voice mails and phone numbers must be avoided.
4) SAFEGUARD MEASURES
Safeguard measures are an indispensable part of app design,
development, and maintenance phases. To avoid situations in
which an insecure mobile interface may compromise users’
privacy and may lead to unauthorized access to the device,
the following recommendations need to be considered:
– Both static and dynamic code analysis techniques [40]
must be adopted to detect potential security and privacy
flaws.
– Weak encryption algorithms with short key lengths must
be avoided [41].
– Since cached data are normally stored on the device,
such data could possibly be transferred to remote loca-
tions and misused. Thus, they must only be used in
HTTPS connections.
– Vulnerability management is an imperative part of an
app maintenance phase. A proper vulnerability manage-
ment mechanism must be followed to ensure that users
are informed in a timely manner to install new updates
as soon as provided.
– The final version of an app’s code (ready-to-publish
version) must be clean (e.g. it must not contain test
methods).
5) SECURE PAYMENT
Many apps are nowadays supporting and offering in-app pur-
chasing which is basically referring to buying goods and
services from inside an app on a smartphone or tablet by
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stimulating users for upgrades to the paid version by offering
additional services. Such a feature enables developers to pro-
vide their apps for free. Therefore, developers are responsible
for ensuring secure payment mechanisms in their apps by
considering the following recommendations:
– Appropriate control mechanisms should be anticipated
to detect suspicious usage patterns in paid-based ser-
vices. When there is a remarkable change in a user’s
location, profile, etc., then using re-authentication con-
trols is strongly recommended.
– Whenever there is a cost implication relevant to a certain
app functionality, users must be adequately and trans-
parently informed, e.g., through easy-to-understand
messages.
– In-app payment measures must be designed and devel-
oped based on the OS/device vendor guidelines.
6) DEVICE AND OS
Security and privacy measures are not always tied to the
app itself, but also the device and OS as the main operat-
ing platform for designing, implementing, and embedding
security and privacy protection measures. In fact, based on
their features, they may enable/limit developers to implement
certain protection mechanisms. Thus, it is highly important to
take the following recommendations into account:
– Using outdated components that are no longer sup-
ported by the device’s and/or OS’s vendor must be
avoided.
– When asking for sensitive inputs from users, auto-
correction and auto-suggestion, as well as cut, copy and
paste functionalities must be disabled.
– Screen captures for app interfaces that may contain
sensitive data must be avoided, e.g., banking apps.
– Input field maskingmust be used for entering passwords.
– For apps dealing with highly sensitive data (health-
based apps, banking apps, etc.), it is necessary to request
for user re-authentication when the app state changes,
e.g., changing state from running in the background to
running in the foreground.
– Accessing sensor-related data such as microphone,
GPS, camera, body sensor, etc. must be minimized. Such
data must not be collected automatically.
– Apps need to be executed within the users’ privilege (root
access is not acceptable).
F. ACCOUNTABILITY
Accountability is one of the key principles of the GDPR and
it requires app developers to demonstrate how they comply
with data protection regulations. This includes careful docu-
mentation of all decision-making procedures with respect to
the ongoing data processing and conducting Data Protection
Impact Assessments (DPIAs) to tackle data protection issues.
1) INTERNAL PROCEDURES
When personal data is being processed, app developers
are required to carefully document all decision making
procedures with respect to the ongoing data processing such
as maintaining certain documentation on what personal data
is processed (how, for how long and for what purpose).
The following recommendations can help to achieve this
goal:
– A security report handling point (address) must be
implemented and maintained aiming at enabling users
to contact app developers/providers conveniently.
– All the required procedures must be anticipated and
established in case a data breach happens (including a
communication channel to react to reports on security
and privacy issues).
– Following best privacy and security practices, devel-
opers must document all privacy and security-relevant
policies, processes, operations and testing correspond-
ing to their developed apps. This also includes the doc-
umentation of risk assessment and management pro-
cedures, compliance with regulations and requirements
(e.g., the GDPR), a record of users’ consent, objections,
contracts with external service providers and third-
parties from which the data is collected or transferred
to, etc.
2) DPIAs
As stated by Art. 35 GDPR, DPIAs are a set of processes that
can help to identify and minimize data protection risks. Due
to the sensitive nature of personal data accessed, collected,
processed, and transferred by mobile apps which is likely to
result in a high risk to individuals, app providers are required
to do DPIAs. Although different DPIAs methodologies have
been proposed [42]–[45], this paper mainly focuses on [43]
which is in turn based on the GDPR. In principle, DPIAs
comprise three main elements, including preparation, evalua-
tion, and reporting and safeguards. In the preparation step,
app providers first determine whether DPIAs are needed.
Accordingly, a list comprising incidents when DPIAs are
necessary should be established including exempt data pro-
cessing types. Essential questions that need to be answered
here are:
Q1: What is the target of the DPIAs evaluation? Describe the
system, identify relevant data and data flows.
Q2: Which actors are involved in the systems? What roles
and permissions do these actors have?
Q3: Which data flows are present? How do actors interact
with them?
In the evaluation step, app providers need to identify the
protection goals, potential attackers, stimulants, objectives,
and evaluation criteria. Afterward, the risk evaluation is car-
ried out. In the final step, i.e., reporting and safeguards,
a concrete plan for risk management needs to be prepared
and established (based on the risk evaluation results). This
is also required by Art. 35(7d) GDPR as DPIAs must contain
measures to remedy the risks identified, including safeguards,
security mechanisms, and measures to protect personal
data.
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G. INTERVENABILITY
Intervenability demands data collectors to make sure that
users are granted their essential rights. Intervenability is also
highly connected to the user’s consent as any data processing
must be based on that.
1) USER’S RIGHTS
TheGDPR defines the user’s rights as the right to be informed
(Art. 15), the right of access (Art. 15), the right to rectification
and erasure (Art. 16, 17), the right to restrict processing
(Art. 18), the right to data portability (Art. 20), the right to
object (Art. 21), and the rights in relation to automated deci-
sionmaking and profiling (Art. 22). Hence, developers should
carefully take these rights into consideration while designing
apps. In fact, the overall architectural design of apps should
allow users to practice these rights [21]. To address this
principle, the following recommendations can be helpful:
– While users are interacting with the app’s interfaces,
they should be given a chance to learn and practice
their rights (access, rectification, erasure, giving and
withdrawing consent, and portability). Also, developers
must embed mechanisms to enable users to understand
where to get help for their questions or problems.
– Inessential personal data must not be asked. Users must
be enabled to delete personal data where appropriate.
– Users must be able to change authentication tokens (e.g.,
passwords). Also, they must be able to disable unwanted
push notifications.
– Users must be clearly informed in case of an app’s
functionality limitation due to the permission request
rejection.
– Users must be able to change the pre-configured
‘‘privacy-by-default’’ setting.
2) USER’S CONSENT
For any personal data processing request, the user’s consent
must be asked. Such processing will be invalid if developers
fail to ask for the user’s consent [21]. A typical issue with a
consent request is the vagueness of such a request. In fact,
developers sometimes provide blurry information concern-
ing the purposes of data processing. Therefore, users are
not well-informed of the potential negative consequences of
giving their consent. Hence, developers should essentially
avoid putting pressure on users (take it or leave it approach)
[21], [23]. The following recommendations can be of help for
an efficient user consent request procedure:
– Whenever any data collection, sharing and process-
ing take place, users must be adequately and explicitly
informed. For such purposes, developers must also clar-
ify what kind of personal data will be collected from
a user; who will be the potential recipients of data;
where data will be hosted and stored and for how long.
Additionally, developers are required to make sure that
they are not collecting more types of data than actually
needed.
– Developers must enable users for consent withdrawal at
any time requested by them. It is important to inform
users about the potential consequences of revoking con-
sent in terms of an app’s functionality.
– Developers are required to maintain a record of a user’s
consent concerning the processing of his/her personal
data from time to time to make it available upon request.
– Asking for a user’s consent for processing his/her per-
sonal data must be separated from asking consent for
other aspects of services offered by developers.
V. DOES WHAT APP DEVELOPERS PROMISE MATCH
REALITY? A CASE STUDY ON ANDROID HEALTH APPS
To investigate the compliance of mobile apps with respect to
the extracted privacy policy principles (see Section IV-D1),
a case study was conducted to analyze the extent to which
the promises made by app developers in app privacy policies
match the actual actions done by them. For this case study,
the top 20 Android health apps on the Google Play Store were
selected. Such a selection is rationalized as follows: (1) Such
apps are sometimes underestimated by users. As compared
with other popular app categories such as Lifestyle, users
are not well-aware of the negative consequences of using
privacy-invasive health apps; (2) As a result of the extreme
proliferation of gadgets and physical activity trackers (such as
FitBit), users are currently surrounded by such technologies.
Such a technological trend is highly dependent on wire-
less communications between gadgets and smartphones (i.e.
health/fitness-based apps) that may impose privacy risks [46];
(3) In contrast to other general-purpose app categories, health
apps are directly dealing with special users’ sensitive data
such as body sensors which are classified as highly sensitive
(Art. 4(13), (14), (15) and Art. 9 and Recitals (51) to (56) of
the GDPR) [2].
In the following (as shown in Fig. 3), the analysis results
regarding the promises (made in privacy policy texts by
developers) and actions (permission usage in reality) on this
selected set of apps are discussed.
A. STEP 1: PROMISES (PRIVACY POLICY) ANALYSIS
The privacy policy text of each app in the data set was inves-
tigated to infer the coverage of each privacy policy principle
presented in Section IV-D1. As can be seen in Table 1 and
detailed in Fig. 4, there is a lot of incidents (92) shown
by×where the apps failed to mention how they comply with
the identified privacy policy principles (principles are shown
by P1–P12 in Table 1). As the analysis shows, in several
instances, developers failed to clarify the compliance of data
protection practices of their appswith different principles. For
instance, ‘‘Privacy Policy Changes’’ (12 apps failed), ‘‘Third-
Country Sharing’’ (9 apps failed), ‘‘Contact Information’’
(9 apps failed), and ‘‘Data Retention’’ (9 apps failed) are
the least covered principles, and no apps covered ‘‘Privacy
Breach Notification’’ at all. On the other hand, the most
covered principles are ‘‘Data Collection’’ (17 apps covered),
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TABLE 1. Coverage of privacy policy principles by the top 20 apps within the Health & Fitness category: no coverage (×), coverage (X).
FIGURE 3. High level overview of the promises vs. actions analysis of
Android apps.
‘‘User’s Control’’ (15 apps covered), and ‘‘Data Protection’’
(14 apps covered), respectively.
The relation between sensitive permission requests by apps
within the data set and their privacy policy notice was inves-
tigated to infer whether or not app developers claim in their
privacy policies that they are going to use certain sensitive
permissions. As shown in Table 2, a great number of incidents
(52) was found that shows app developers have failed to
clarify the need for requesting certain sensitive permissions
in their written privacy policy texts (shown by×).
B. STEP2: ACTION (REAL PERMISSION USAGE) ANALYSIS
We monitored the permission access patterns of apps within
our data set. The apps were installed on several devices that
had a pre-configured data capture tool described in [47], [48]
FIGURE 4. Number of apps failed to comply with the identified
app privacy policy principles.
to record API accesses from the OS. The collected logs were
then analyzed and interpreted to determine apps permission
access patterns. Next subsection elaborates on the identified
mismatches found between STEP1 and STEP2.
C. IDENTIFIED MISMATCHES BETWEEN PROMISES AND
ACTIONS
Fig. 5 illustrates and compares the number of apps that failed
to specify the need for requesting sensitive permissions in
their privacy policy texts, but accessed those permissions in
reality (blue bar chart) and apps who clarified the need for
requesting sensitive permissions and accessed those permis-
sions (green bar chart). Both cases are problematic from a
privacy perspective. The former shows that app developers
do not tend to rigorously clarify the need for permission
requests in their privacy policy texts, and in parallel, they
request to access those permissions in reality. This indicates
that what they promise in privacy policy texts does not nec-
essarily match what they do. The investigation shows that for
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TABLE 2. Purpose specification of permission requests in app privacy policy text: clarified in the policy: X, not clarified in the policy:×, not using that
permission: N.
FIGURE 5. Identified mismatches between what apps promise and what
they do.
all the analyzed permissions (except BODY_SENSOR) apps
are not fully honest in their privacy policy texts, however,
they access those permissions in reality. As an example of
such permission accesses, we can refer to CAMERA (6 apps),
CONTACTS (3 apps), LOCATION (3 apps), PHONE_STATE
(2 apps), RECORD_AUDIO (2 apps), and SMS (1 app). The
behavior of the second group of apps (green bar chart) is
not aligned with the ‘‘data minimization’’ principle. Since
in this experiment the apps were not being used (they were
in idle mode), accessing such sensitive permissions is not
well-justified. This is mainly because apps are supposed to
be task-specific (accessing permissions when needed). But in
this case, the accelerometer and step detector sensors were not
active. Such resource accesses indicate the potential violation
of Art. 5 (1(c)) of the GDPR which states that ‘‘personal data
shall be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary
in relation to the purposes for which it is processed (data
minimization)’’. In addition, this is also not aligned with the
PoLP [25] which indicates that ‘‘every program and every
user of the system should operate using the least set of
privileges necessary to complete the job’’.
D. DISCUSSION
The results of this case study confirm that models on privacy
policy practices of mobile apps are problematic and regula-
tions become necessary when users do not have the chance
to get correct and full information about data collection prac-
tices of apps. Thus, it is argued that app developers should
carefully specify the need for requesting sensitive permis-
sions in their privacy policy texts. Additionally, app privacy
policies need to be severely revisited by their developers as
it was observed that there is a substantial number of privacy
policies that do not focus on apps’ data sharing and collection
practices, rather unrelated contents. By simplifying access
to data protection goals and principles of smartphone apps,
the presently App Developers Guide can potentially assist
mobile app developers in providing more privacy-friendly
services considering the whole life cycle of apps.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the importance of app developers’ privacy
awareness was studied. App developers were provided with
contributions to design privacy-friendly mobile apps. Based
on intensive regulatory document examinations, security-
and privacy-friendly app design guidelines were presented
aiming at assisting developers in following good privacy
and security practices before, during, and after app design
and development phases. The results revealed that there is
still a significant difference between what app developers
promise (in app privacy policy texts) and what they do in
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reality (real permission usage). By structuring mobile apps’
privacy and security principles into a technical guide catalog,
the results achieved from this paper can support app devel-
opers to comprehend, adopt and apply regulation-friendly
mobile app design practices.
The achieved results must be interpreted with caution and
a number of limitations should be borne in mind. Since this
research was conducted in Europe, the most focus was on
EU-relevant legislation and the importance of their adoption
by mobile app developers. Moreover, the data may contain
an implicit bias toward relevant EU privacy regulations and
attitudes. While the data capture tool measures static per-
mission declaration and actual use during run-time, it will
be difficult to estimate the reasons for and intentions behind
the particular permission use. Therefore, not all permission
uses may relate to an actual privacy risk. Furthermore, since
both app’s versions and privacy policy texts get updated
regularly, reproducibility is challenging in such a setting.
Therefore, it will be difficult to re-create the exact test setting.
Additionally, the examined app set was mainly taken from
the most downloaded apps on the Google Play Store as a
very small subset of the millions of apps available in various
appmarkets. Amore extensive case study could provide more
insights into the validity of the results. However, as the top 20
apps are usually judged as a measure of the app downloads on
app markets [49], it can be argued that the findings may exert
to the apps with the greatest impact on users.
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